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A growing body of evidence suggests that managerial traits affect corporate policies even after 
controlling for the firm-, industry-, and market-level economic indicators that influence these 
policies. However, we know relatively little about how managers’ decision-making develops 
throughout their careers. In this paper, we investigate the potential impact of professional, or 
work-related, experiences of managers on corporate financial and investment policies.  
The importance of experience in decision-making is broadly demonstrated in the 
psychology literature (Nisbett and Ross (1980)). Studies show that experience may lead 
individuals to make decisions that differ from those based on expected utility theory because 
they only have access to samples of past outcomes and not the full outcome distributions (e.g., 
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2004), Hertwig and Erev (2009), and Hertwig (2012)). In 
Finance, a growing literature examines how individual experiences impact investor behavior 
(Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), Kaustia and Knupfer (2008), Greenwood and Nagel (2009), Chiang, 
Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011), and Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2013)).  
We build on this literature and explore how professional experiences, which occur in a 
similar corporate setting and are therefore relevant to the type of decision making required from 
corporate managers, impact managers’ decisions and career paths. Our focus is on past 
experience with poor corporate outcomes such as bankruptcy, financing difficulties, and adverse 
shocks. We focus on these outcomes because they are salient events that might exert a significant 
effect on managers’ behavior. Experiencing troubles may alter managers’ risk preferences or 
expectations, and therefore cause managers to implement more conservative financial policies. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the “hot stove” effect described in Denrell and Marsh (2001), 
which implies a bias against risky alternatives to avoid actions that have led to poor outcomes in 
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the past. Indeed, empirical studies show that bankruptcy and distress lead to poor personal 
outcomes for the CEO (Eckbo and Thornburn (2003) and Eckbo, Thornburn, and Wang (2012)). 
To determine the effect of managers’ professional experiences on corporate decisions, we 
use data from ExecuComp and BoardEx to track the employment history of approximately 5,200 
CEOs and 4,000 CFOs in 3,546 firms. After excluding managers with relatively short or 
incomplete employment histories,1 the average CEO in our sample has 21 years of employment 
data at 4 different firms. We use these data to determine if a manager was previously employed 
by a troubled firm. To separate CEO effects from firm effects, we require the professional 
experience to take place at a different firm than the current firm and that the current firm itself 
did not experience difficulties.  
We construct five measures of poor corporate outcomes. Based on each measure, we 
define a Professional experience indicator that equals one if the manager was employed by a 
firm that experienced trouble during her tenure. To address the concern that the CEO is chosen 
based on her experience in running troubled firms, we only consider experience in roles other 
than the CEO. The first measure is based on bankruptcy filings. In our sample, 0.8% of the CEOs 
previously worked at a firm that filed for bankruptcy. Since bankruptcy is relatively infrequent 
and salient enough to impact a manager’s career directly, we construct four additional measures. 
These additional measures are based on adverse shocks to a firm’s cash flows and stock returns, 
credit ratings, and financial constraints. Depending on the measure employed, 8.1 to 12.4% of 
the CEOs in our sample experienced trouble in at least one year of prior employment. We also 
create a composite index equal to one if any of these measures equals one. 
                                                            
1 Specifically, to be included in our sample, the CEO must have at least 10 years of observable and continuous 
employment data, with no time gaps, before the start of her current employment.  
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In panel regressions, we find that firms run by a CEO who was previously employed at a 
troubled firm issue less debt, hold more cash, and invest less. These results hold after controlling 
for firm and manager characteristics, and after including industry and year fixed effects to 
control for industry- and market-wide determinants. The effects are statistically significant at 
conventional levels and are economically meaningful. For the average firm, past experience at a 
troubled firm is associated with a reduction of 31-58% in debt issuance (issuing 0.8-1.5 
percentage points less debt-to-assets), an increase of 7-23% in cash (holding 1.7-5.4 percentage 
points more cash-to-assets), and a reduction of 5-20% in capital expenditure (investing 0.3-1.2 
percentage points less in capital expenditures-to-assets).  
These findings suggest that firms run by CEOs who experienced distress in the past have 
more conservative financial and investment policies. This relation can operate through two 
possible channels: (1) the manager joins a firm that is already conservative prior to her 
appointment (the appointment channel), and (2) the manager implements more conservative 
corporate policies after her appointment (the corporate policy channel). Alternatively, our 
findings may reflect the firm’s decision to hire a CEO that experienced distress because the firm 
chooses to implement a more conservative policy than it has previously followed (selection). In 
what follows, we examine the effect of professional experiences via both the corporate policy 
and appointment channels, while controlling for selection. 
To capture the effect of the appointment channel, we investigate the relation between the 
professional experience of the CEO and the firm’s policies prior to the appointment of the CEO.  
We find that managers who experienced distress become the CEOs of firms that are historically 
more conservative. This effect, however, is relatively small and accounts for about 11-31% of 
our estimates of the conservative policies of firms run by managers who experienced distress. 
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To disentangle the corporate policy channel from the appointment channel, we exploit the 
change to the professional experience of the CEO around CEO turnovers. This identification 
strategy allows us to control for unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with a 
firm’s financial and investment policy and the choice of the CEO, to the extent that these 
characteristics remain unchanged within a short time window around the CEO turnover. We 
examine all turnovers, a subset that represent natural causes (death or illness), planned 
retirements, or scheduled succession plans, and a subset of successions by internal candidates.  
We examine natural causes and scheduled successions to address selection and the concern that 
some CEO turnovers may be caused by poor performance or financing difficulties, which may 
impact the firms’ need for cash, debt issuances, and investment opportunity set, and confound 
our empirical inference. We also examine internal CEO successions because these candidates are 
less likely chosen due to their previous professional experience at other firms since they come 
from inside the firm.  
In firm fixed effects and first differences models that exclude the three years surrounding 
the turnover, our empirical results indicate that CEOs with professional experience at troubled 
firms decrease debt issuances-to-assets by 0.8-1.4 percentage points, increase the cash-to-assets 
ratio by 1.6-1.7 percentage points, and decrease capital expenditures-to-assets by 0.5-0.8 
percentage points after they became CEOs.  These effects represent a sizable shift in corporate 
policy and account for 69-89% of the overall impact of professional experiences. The results 
hold in all the subsets of CEO turnovers and are statistically significant at conventional levels.  
As mentioned above, it is important to disentangle the corporate policy channel from a 
scenario in which firms that wish to implement more conservative policies hire CEOs who 
experienced distress and may be more likely to implement conservative policies. Our analysis 
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thus far addresses selection by excluding prior employment as the CEO of other firms and by 
considering a subset of exogenous and internal CEO turnovers, which are less prone to selection 
concerns. For robustness, we also focus on experiences early in the manager’s career, including 
her first job and experiences outside the industry, which are less likely to impact her selection for 
the current position. Using these alternative definitions of experience, we obtain similar results.  
Since our analysis thus far focuses on CEOs and not CFOs, our findings allow for two 
interpretations: (1) CEOs alone determine financing and investment policies, or (2) CFOs also 
determine these policies, but their decisions are positively correlated with CEO experience. One 
advantage of our empirical design is that the experience is manager specific and we can therefore 
construct our measures of professional experience for CFOs and distinguish these alternative 
explanations. We therefore recreate our measures of experience and find that 0.6 to 12.5% of the 
CFOs in our sample worked at a troubled firm (in roles other than the CFO). When we 
investigate the joint impact of CEO and CFO experience on corporate policy, we find that both 
CEO and CFO experiences affect corporate financing policy, debt issuance and cash savings. 
However, corporate investment policy is only affected by CEO experience, suggesting that CFOs 
do not exert significant influence on the firm’s investment decision. 
Out analysis shows that experiencing distress entails conservative corporate policies. 
These conservative policies, however, can be suboptimal if CEOs that experienced distress 
become too risk averse or overestimate the likelihood and implications of distress. Conversely, 
conservative policies may result from CEO learning or altering the view of the average CEO 
who underestimates risk, as recently found by Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013). We 
provide indirect evidence on the optimality of the effects by investigating how our results differ 
based on a firm’s corporate governance, as measured by the E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
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Ferrell (2009)) of shareholder rights, the presence of share block holders, and board 
independence. We find that the effect of professional experience on firms’ financial and 
investment decisions is stronger at poorly governed firms. These findings are consistent with 
distress leading a manager to enact overly conservative policies when the manager is not 
monitored by outside investors and the board of directors.  
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that studies the effects of managers on 
corporate policies. While existing evidence suggests that management style affects corporate 
policies (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)), largely following endogenous CEO turnovers (Fee, 
Hadlock, and Pierce (2013)), we still know relatively little about the determinants of this style 
and its evolution throughout a manager’s career. Our paper improves our understanding of this 
process by studying the effect of professional experiences on managers’ careers and the 
financing and investment decisions they make. Our findings complement the recent evidence in 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), who show that early 
personal experiences of managers, such as growing up during the Great Depressions and military 
service affect corporate leverage and investment. 
Our paper is also related to the recent debate about firms’ investment and financing 
policies following the recent financial crisis. While some argue that the recent accumulation of 
cash savings and the low investment ratios are consistent with a Keynesian (1936) precautionary 
savings motive, others argue that managers are overly conservative. For example, the article 
“Blame fear, not greed, as firms hoard cash”, published in the Wall Street Journal on July 1, 
2012, argues that: “... Here is one way to explain the record sacks of cash that companies have 
amassed: Just as courage imperils life, fear protects it. Actually, that line is said to be Leonardo 
da Vinci's. But if you spend any time with chief financial officers, you'll hear the same 
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admonition in one form or another…. And, despite what some suggest, it doesn't appear to be 
guided by greed or complacency. Instead, fear rules the day. Arguably too much so.” The 
evidence in our paper indicates that this behavior may be explained by managerial conservatism 
resulting from experiencing financing constraints and difficulties during the recent crisis.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data. Section II examines the 
impact of CEOs’ professional experience on corporate policies. Section III focuses on robustness 
tests and extensions. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
I. Sample and Data 
A. Firms 
Our initial sample consists of 11,578 industrial firms in the CRSP/Compustat file over 1980-
2011. Industrial firms are defined as companies with SIC codes outside the ranges 4900-4949 
(utilities) and 6000-6999 (financials). We exclude firms that are not incorporated in the U.S. and 
those that do not have securities assigned a CRSP security code of 10 or 11. Since we are 
interested in CEOs’ professional experiences, we exclude firms whose CEO is missing from 
ExecuComp and BoardEx. We find 5,498 firms and 52,017 firm-year observations for which the 
CEO has non-missing data on previous employment in at least one firm that appears on 
Compustat.  
 Next, we exclude from our sample CEOs with relatively short observable employment 
histories of less than 10 years before the start of their current employment. We also exclude 
CEOs whose employment history over the prior 10 years before the start of current employment 
is incomplete (one or more years are missing). We impose these sample screens because the 
length of the observed employment history and the gaps in the data may be nonrandom, and 
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potentially correlated with CEO attributes such as tenure or age, and with firm attributes such as 
size, industry, and IPO cohort. To separate CEO effects from firm effects, we also require that 
the firms in our sample did not experience difficulties according to any of our measures, 
described in subsection I.C. After imposing these screens, our final sample includes 3,546 firms 
and 28,958 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. We winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to lessen the influence of outliers. The main variables of interest are a firm’s: (1) net 
debt issuance/assets, defined as the ratio of the annual change in debt to book assets; (2) 
cash/assets, defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to book assets; and (3) capital 
expenditure/assets, defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to book assets. Table 1 shows that 
net debt issuances have a pooled mean of 2.6%, cash ratios have a pooled mean of 24.0%, and 
capital expenditures have a pooled mean of 6.0%. The average firm has a log of assets (sales) of 
6.0 (5.6). Table 1 also shows that the average firm has a cash flow-to-assets ratio of 2.1%, a 
market-to-book ratio of 2.3, and a ratio of fixed assets to assets (tangibility) of 26.4%. The 
average firm has a net debt ratio of -1.2%, indicating it has more cash than debt, and a short- 
(long-) term debt ratio of 3.8% (19.0%).  
 
B. Managers 
Our sample of executives consists of 9,133 individuals. This group includes 5,178 CEOs and 
3,955 CFOs who served at our sample firms between 1980 and 2011. To collect employment 
information on CEOs and CFOs, we use both ExecuComp and BoardEx. For each executive in 
our sample, we collect all available information on her employment history, including the 
identity of previous employers, dates of employment, and the role title. We then match the prior 
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employers to Compustat firms and use Compustat data to construct our measures of professional 
experience at troubled firms.   
Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for our sample of managers. An average CEO 
is 52.8 years old, has a firm tenure of 7.3 years, and owns 2.7% of the firm’s shares. The vast 
majority (97.8%) of CEOs are male. An average CFO is slightly younger (47.1 years old), has a 
firm tenure of 6.8 years, and owns 1.5% of the firm’s shares. Also, 7.6% of CFOs are female. 
Further, 33.3% of the CEOs and 46.5% of the CFOs have an MBA degree. 
 
C. Measures of Past Professional Experience 
We study how work-related experiences throughout managers’ professional lives affect 
managers’ careers and corporate policies. Our focus is on realizations of poor outcomes, that is, 
experiences of bankruptcy and distress. Our analysis is motivated by the Psychology literature, 
which shows that individual experiences impact decision-making (Nisbett and Ross (1980)). 
More specifically, we build on the “hot stove” effect, studied by Marsh (1996), Denrell and 
Marsh (2001), and Denrell (2007), which implies a bias against risky alternatives to avoid 
actions that have led to poor outcomes. Our main hypothesis, therefore, suggests that managers 
that experienced poor outcomes of bankruptcy and distress in the past subsequently work in more 
conservative firms and implement more conservative corporate policies. 
In contrast to prior studies, we focus on professional experiences rather than life 
experiences such as military service and growing up during the Great Depression. We do so 
because professional experiences are typically more frequent and recent, and therefore may exert 
greater influence on decision-making. Further, they occur in a similar corporate setting and thus 
likely comprise relevant experiences for CEO shaping how the CEO will manage the firm. 
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Finally, they can occur throughout a CEO’s career, thus implying that her decision-making may 
change and evolve throughout her career. 
To measure CEOs’ professional experience, we track the employment history of the CEO 
using data from ExecuComp and BoardEx to determine if the CEO was previously employed at a 
troubled firm. We restrict our attention to previous employment at other firms to disentangle 
CEO effects from firm effects. To mitigate the concern of reverse causality, a scenario in which 
the CEO is selected by the current firm based on her management style, we focus on professional 
experience in non-CEO roles. To further control for firm effects, our tests exclude firms that 
experienced difficulties themselves and control for firm-, industry-, and market-level, time-
varying determinants of corporate policies.  
Our measures of professional experience are based on the full set of information we have 
available for each manager. For robustness and completeness, we employ five measures of 
distress. The first measure is based on bankruptcy filings. The bankruptcy data come from the 
Bankruptcy Research Database of Professor Lynn LoPucki at UCLA Law School, which 
includes all bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, for 
firms that had assets worth $100 million or more (in 1980 dollars), and filed an annual report for 
a year ending not less than three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case.  Managers who 
previously worked at a firm that filed for bankruptcy during their employment are defined as 
having experienced bankruptcy. A potential concern with the bankruptcy-based measure, 
however, is that bankruptcy filing is salient enough to exert a significant direct effect on a 
manager’s career that is unrelated to its impact on her decision-making. Moreover, as Panel B of 
Table 2 shows, bankruptcy experience is relatively infrequent and only 0.8% of the CEOs in our 
sample experienced bankruptcy in the past. We therefore construct four additional measures.  
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We construct two measures that focus on financial constraints. The first measure is based 
on a firm’s bond ratings. We retrieve data on bond ratings for all industrial firms on Compustat, 
and sort all firm-year observations into annual deciles based on the bond ratings.2 Each year, we 
define firms in the lowest decile as financially constrained and all other firms as unconstrained. 
Thus, we restrict our attention to severe financial constraints, which are more likely to impact the 
CEO’s decision-making. Related approaches for characterizing financial constraints are used by 
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach (2004). The advantage of this measure is that it gauges the market’s assessment of 
a firm’s credit quality. Managers who previously worked at a firm that was categorized as 
financially constrained during their employment are defined as having past experience at a 
constrained firm. Panel B of Table 2 shows that 8.1% of the CEOs in our sample experienced 
difficulties according to this measure. 
Our second measure of financial constraints is based on an index of financial constraints 
developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). We choose this index over other indices, including the 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006) indices, because it does not rely on the 
firm’s leverage and cash holdings, the very policies we study, to measure financing constraints. 
However, in unreported tests we have also estimated our results using the Kaplan-Zingales and 
the Whited-Wu indices and obtained similar results.  
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) categorize financial constraints based on qualitative 
information from financial filings and propose a measure of financial constraints that is based on 
firm size and age. Specifically, they create the following index of financial constraints, which 
they call the size-age or SA index: 
                                                            
2 To address missing ratings, we determine if the firm has had a rating at any point during our sample period. If so, 
we fill in the missing value with the closest rating (past or future); otherwise, we consider that firm unconstrained.  
Firms with missing ratings are not used to calculate the rating deciles. 
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SA	index	 	 0.737 ∙ Size 0.043 ∙ Size 0.040 ∙  
where size is the log of inflation-adjusted book assets and age is the number of years the firm has 
been on Compustat with a non-missing stock price. We calculate the SA index for the entire set 
of industrial firms on Compustat, and sort all firm-year observations into annual deciles based on 
the SA index. Each year, we define firms in the most constrained decile as financially 
constrained and all other firms as unconstrained. Once again, managers who previously worked 
at a firm that was categorized as financially constrained during their employment are defined as 
having past experience at a constrained firm. Panel B of Table 2 shows that 9.5% of the CEOs 
experienced financial constraints according to this measure. 
Our two remaining measures of experience focus on adverse shocks to a firm’s operating 
cash flows and stock returns, respectively. We define a firm’s operating cash flow as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total book assets. We 
sort all industrial firms on Compustat into annual deciles based on the change in annual 
operating cash flow and categorize firms in the lowest decile each year as experiencing distress. 
Similarly, we calculate a firm’s annual stock return and sort all industrial firms on Compustat 
into annual deciles based on their stock returns and categorize firms in the lowest decile each 
year as experiencing distress. We define managers who previously worked at a firm that was in 
the lowest decile during their employment as having past experience of distress. Panel B of Table 
2 shows that 12.4% (12.1%) of the CEOs in our sample experienced distress according to the 
cash flow-based (stock return-based) measure.  
In addition, we also create a composite index which is equal to one if any of the above 
experience measures is equal to one. Panel B of Table 2 shows that 25.1% of the CEOs in our 
sample experienced distress according to at least one of the experience measures.  
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Panel C of Table 2 reports the sample-wide correlations between the measures of 
professional experience. The estimates show that, as expected, all measures of distress are 
positively correlated. These measures, however, are only imperfectly correlated, suggesting that 
they capture different dimensions of distress. 
Panel D of Table 2 provides additional details about the employment history and 
professional experiences of CEOs. We observe 21.4 years of employment, in 3.9 firms, for the 
average CEO in our sample. Similarly, for CEOs that experienced distress according to any of 
our measures, we observe 21.0 years of employment in 3.7 firms for these managers. Focusing 
on the subset of CEOs that experienced distress, the average CEO in this subsample experienced 
difficulties 1.2 times. On average, the number of years since the first experience of distress is 
11.9 years and the number of years since the last experience is 5.2 years. Further, 28.4% of the 
CEOs experienced difficulties in their first position, reflecting a close to even distribution over 
the approximately 3.7 firms in the manager’s employment history. In the robustness section, we 
test whether recent, distant, and first-job experiences of distress have a different effect on the 
firm’s policies.   
Our main focus is on the professional experience of the CEO, since the ultimate 
responsibility for the firm’s financial and investment strategies rests with the CEO. However, we 
also study the experience of the CFO, who may assist the CEO with financing decisions. We 
therefore create each measure of experience for CFOs, described in Panels B and D of Table 2. 
 
II. CEO Professional Experience and Corporate Policies 
A. Does Professional Experience Impact Corporate Policy? 
Table 3 presents results of panel regressions of debt issuance (Panel A), cash savings (Panel B), 
and capital expenditures (Panel C) on the professional experience of the CEO and a relevant set 
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of firm-level determinants of each of these policies. To control for industry-level characteristics 
and market-wide effects, all regressions include 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the firm level.  
To distinguish the effect of professional experience, we control for other CEO traits that 
may impact corporate policy. First, we control for CEO age because an older CEO has had more 
time to be exposed to different firm environments and thus may be more likely to have 
experienced distress. Further, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that CEO age has a significant 
effect on corporate policies. Second, we control for the gender of the CEO because prior studies 
show that men are more likely to take risk than females. Barber and Odean (2001) and Weber, 
Blais, and Betz (2002), for example, show that financial risk-taking differs by gender. More 
broadly, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) and Eckel and Grossman (2008) provide a review of 
the literature on differential risk taking by gender. Third, we control for CEOs’ financial 
education using an MBA indicator that equals 1 if the CEO has an MBA degree. Financial 
literacy may lead managers to rely more on external finance in lieu of internal cash savings. 
Lastly, we control for CEO stock and stock option ownership, which may contractually mitigate 
the effects of CEO preferences or the influences of past experiences, and may also affect the 
incentives of the CEO to take risk. 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents the regression estimates for debt issuance, measured as the 
change in total debt divided by total assets. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), our firm-level 
controls include size (log sales), the market-to-book ratio as a measure of investment 
opportunities, profitability, and the tangibility of assets (the ratio of fixed to total assets). The 
results in Panel A indicate a negative relation between debt issuance and CEOs’ professional 
experience of distress, as captured by the variable Professional experience. This relation is 
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consistently negative across all measures of distress, and is statistically significant at 
conventional levels in all cases except for the measure based on the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
index of financial constraint. The economic magnitudes are substantial and comparable in size 
across all columns: experiencing distress is associated with a 0.8 to 1.5 percentage point decline 
in the firm’s debt issuance. For a manager overseeing a firm with mean characteristics, this effect 
is associated with a reduction of 31-58% in debt issuance.  
An analysis of the other control variables shows that, consistent with Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), there is a positive relation between size and debt issuance and a negative relation 
between profitability and debt issuance. We do not find, however, a significant relation between 
tangibility and debt issuance. Further, we find a positive relation between the market-to-book 
ratio and debt issuance, suggesting that firms with more investment opportunities issue more 
debt. We also find that older CEOs, male CEOs, CEOs with an MBA degree, and CEOs with 
higher stock option ownership tend to issue more debt. These findings are consistent with greater 
risk-taking by older and male CEOs. They are also consistent with greater reliance on external 
finance due to financial literacy following an MBA degree. Finally, these results suggest that 
risk-taking incentives resulting from a CEO’s compensation structure predict debt issuance. 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents the results for a firm’s cash savings policy, measured as 
cash and short-term assets divided by total assets. The regressions include firm-level proxies for 
the precautionary savings motive, the predominant motivation to hold cash based on Keynes 
(1936) and Miller and Orr (1966). The empirical predictions of this theory suggest that firms 
with lower cash flows, higher cash flow volatility, better investment opportunities, and lower 
credit ratings will hold more cash. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano 
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(2010), Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011), and others, all find empirical support 
for the precautionary savings motive. We also control for the firm’s size since prior research 
(e.g., Opler et al. (1999)) shows there are economies of scale in cash policy.  
The empirical results in Panel B show a positive relation between cash savings and 
CEOs’ Professional experience. This relation is consistently significant at conventional levels 
across all measures of distress. The economic magnitudes are nontrivial: professional experience 
of distress is associated with a 1.7 to 5.4 percentage point increase in the firm’s cash savings. For 
a manager overseeing a firm with mean characteristics, this effect is associated with an extra 
$4.6 - $14.7 million in cash savings (in 2011 dollars).  
As expected, an analysis of the other control variables suggests that firms with higher 
cash flow volatility, firms with lower cash flows, firms with higher market-to-book ratios (our 
proxy for investment opportunities), firms with lower bond ratings, and smaller firms, hold more 
cash. These results are consistent with the precautionary savings motive and with previous 
research (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)). We also find that younger 
CEOs, female CEOs, CEOs without an MBA degree, and CEOs with lower stock option 
ownership, tend to hold more cash. Under the view that cash is negative debt, these results are 
uniformly consistent with the findings in Panel A. 
Panel C of Table 3 analyzes the effect of a CEO’s professional experience on a firm’s 
investment policy, as measured by the ratio of capital expenditures to book assets. The 
regressions control for firm-level investment opportunities, as measured by the market-to-book 
ratio, and cash flows. The estimates suggest that capital expenditures are negatively associated 
with professional experiences of distress. The effects are consistently negative across all 
measures and are statistically significant in all cases except the cash flow shocks-based measure. 
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The economic magnitudes are large: professional experience of distress is associated with a 0.3 
to 1.2 percentage point decline in the firm’s capital expenditures. For a manager overseeing a 
firm with mean characteristics, this effect is associated with a reduction of 5-20% in capital 
expenditures. An analysis of the control variables indicates that firms with higher investment 
opportunities invest more in capital expenditures, while cash flows do not exert a significant 
effect on investment, consistent with a standard neoclassical model of corporate investment. We 
find weak evidence that younger CEOs tend to invest more, as do CEOs with fewer stocks and 
stock options.  
Taken together, our evidence shows that a manager’s experience at firms that faced 
distress captures a significant effect beyond the firm-, industry-, and market-level determinants 
of corporate policy, controlling for a wide range of CEO characteristics that may impact her 
incentives and preferences. Professional experiences of difficulties earlier in a manager’s career, 
at other firms and in non-CEO roles, are associated with more conservative corporate policies: 
less debt issuance, more cash savings, and smaller investment in capital expenditures.  
 
B. Channels of Conservatism: Appointment and Corporate Policy 
To disentangle the effects of the appointment channel and the corporate policy channel, 
we investigate the relationship between the CEO’s professional experience and corporate 
policies before and after CEO turnover. To capture the effect of the appointment channel, we 
examine the relationship between the professional experience of a new CEO and the historical 
policies of the firm she is about to run. To test this relation, we focus on the year prior to the year 
immediately preceding the turnover year. We exclude the year that immediately precedes the 
turnover year to mitigate the potential effects of the upheaval surrounding CEO turnover. 
However, the results are similar if we use the year immediately preceding the turnover year. In 
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this regression analysis, the dependent variable is one of the firm’s corporate policies: debt 
issuance (Panel A), cash savings (Panel B), and investment in capital expenditures (Panel C) in 
the year prior to the year preceding the new CEO’s appointment. The key variable of interest is 
the Professional experience index, defined as an indicator equal to 1 if the newly appointed CEO 
worked at another firm that experienced distress. Other independent variables include the same 
set of CEO-, firm-, industry-, and market-level determinants of each of the corporate policies 
used in Table 3, which are not shown to conserve space. As before, the standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that CEOs with professional experience of distress are 
appointed to firms that historically issue less debt, hold more cash, and invest less in capital 
expenditures. The signs of the regression coefficients are consistent across all measures of 
distress, albeit the results are not always statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
statistical significance is particularly weak in the tests of capital expenditures. Based on the 
composite index of professional experience in Column 6, the economic magnitude of this 
channel implies that CEOs with professional experience of distress issue 0.2 percentage points 
less debt (Panel A), save 1.0 percentage points in cash (Panel B), and invest 0.1 percentage 
points less in capital expenditure (Panel C).  
We interpret these findings as evidence that CEOs who experienced distress join more 
conservative firms. Our specification in Table 4 was developed under the assumption that 
appointments of CEOs are based on historical characteristics of firms. It is also possible that 
appointments of CEOs incorporate forward-looking information about firms. For example, CEOs 
who experienced difficulties may be appointed to firms that are expected to be more conservative 
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in the future. In this case, our estimates of the economic magnitude of the appointment channel 
likely represent a lower bound for the effects of this channel. 
To capture the effect of the corporate policy channel incremental to the appointment 
channel, we focus on CEO turnovers, a setting in which the firm experiences a shock to the 
experience of its CEO. An important issue in this analysis is that some CEO turnovers may be 
driven by a change in the firm’s investment opportunities, the poor performance of the departing 
CEO, or other potential determinants of the firm’s corporate policy, which may confound our 
tests. The main concern is that the turnover of the CEO is driven by reverse causality, a scenario 
in which the CEO is replaced with a new CEO that experienced distress to implement more 
conservative corporate policies, in which case the effects cannot be attributed to the corporate 
policy channel. 
To mitigate this concern, we use a subset of CEO turnovers that are unlikely to be 
associated with managerial performance or a change in the firm’s conditions. In particular, we 
focus on the CEO turnovers that meet one of the following terms: 
1) The departing CEO dies, departs due to an illness, or is at least 60 years old.    
2) The media article or the firm’s press release explicitly states that the CEO change is part of 
the firm’s succession plan. 
These turnovers occur either unexpectedly or as part of the firm’s management 
succession plan, and hence are unlikely to be caused by underperformance or changes in the 
firm’s conditions that may warrant a change in the firm’s corporate policies. To classify CEO 
turnovers, we follow the approach of Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) and read the article in 
The Wall Street Journal and the firm’s press release associated with the CEO change for the 
specific reasons given for the turnover. We also collect information on the CEO’s age at the time 
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of the turnover from BoardEx. We find that 67.3% of CEO turnovers in our sample satisfy these 
criteria, consistent with the frequency of voluntary CEO turnovers estimated in the literature 
(e.g., Yermack (2006), Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2013), Jenter and Kanaan (2012)). 
 Another way to isolate the corporate policy channel is to focus on a subset of internal 
turnovers, in which the new CEO was already an employee of the firm before she was appointed 
as CEO. In this setting, the choice of the CEO to work at a conservative firm due to her 
experience of distress in a different firm (the appointment channel) is likely weaker because she 
had already worked at the firm prior to her appointment as CEO. Furthermore, this setting also 
mitigates the concern that the new CEO is selected to implement more conservative policies for 
the exact same reason - she had already worked in the firm prior to her appointment.  
Table 5 reports estimates from the following two regression models for the three sets of 
CEO turnovers (All CEO turnovers, Succession/Health/Age-Related CEO turnovers, Internal 
turnovers):  (1) Firm fixed effects panel regressions that only include firms whose CEOs turned 
over during our sample period; and (2) Difference regressions that compare the financial policy 
two years prior to the turnover of the CEO and two years after the turnover. In both regression 
models, we exclude the three-year window surrounding the turnover (i.e., we exclude the 
turnover year and the year that immediately precedes and immediately follows the turnover year) 
to mitigate the potential effects of the upheaval surrounding CEO turnover. In columns 1-3 of 
each panel, the key independent variable is the composite index of the professional experience of 
the newly appointed CEO. In columns 4-6, the key independent variable is the change in the 
index of professional experience of the CEO resulting from the turnover.3 As in Table 4, all of 
the regressions include CEO-, firm-, industry-, and market-level determinants of each of the 
                                                            
3 The change in the CEO’s professional experience equals 1 if the new CEO experienced difficulties and the 
departing CEO did not, 0 if both CEOs either experienced or did not experience difficulties, and -1 if the new CEO 
did not experience difficulties whereas the departing CEO did. 
20
corporate policies, which are not presented to conserve space. Similar to the index of 
professional experience, columns 1-3 include the control variables in levels and columns 4-6 
include them in differences from two years before the turnover to two years after the turnover. 
As before, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The results across all panels of Table 5 show that when a new CEO that experienced 
distress is appointed as CEO, the firm reduces its debt issuance, increases its cash savings, and 
cuts its investment in capital expenditures. These results hold across both regression models and 
for all subsets of CEO turnover, and are statistically significant at conventional levels in all cases 
except Column 6 of Panel B.  
The economic magnitude of the corporate policy channel is similar across samples and 
models and is nontrivial: based on the sample of all CEO turnovers, a newly appointed CEO that 
experienced distress reduces debt issuance by 1.4 percentage points, increases cash holdings by 
2.4 percentage points, and decreases capital expenditures by 0.8 percentage points. For a 
manager overseeing a firm with mean characteristics, this effect is associated with a reduction of 
54% in debt issuance, an increase of 10% in cash holdings, and a decrease of 13% in investment. 
In comparison to the appointment channel, the corporate policy channel is approximately seven 
times as important in debt issuance, about twice as important for cash holdings, and about eight 
times as important for capital expenditures.4 
  
                                                            
4 We arrive at these estimates by comparing the 1.4, 2.4, and 0.8 percentage point change in debt issuance, cash 
holdings, and investment, respectively, reported for the corporate policy channel in Table 5, to the 0.2, 1.1, and 0.1 
percentage point change in these policies, respectively, reported for the appointment channel in Table 4.  
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III. Robustness and Extensions  
A. Timing, Industry, and Frequency of Professional Experience 
One concern with our findings is that the CEO’s professional experience is incorporated into her 
hiring by the firm’s board of directors or shareholders. It is therefore possible that the CEO is 
hired to implement more conservative corporate policies because of her professional experience 
at troubled firms. If board members are concerned about the firm’s expected financial conditions, 
they may select a CEO experienced at running a troubled firm. Under this view, our estimates of 
the impact of the corporate policy channel may capture the forward-looking hiring decision made 
by the firm, or the endogenous matching between the CEO and the firm (selection), and not a 
direct effect of the CEO’s professional experience (treatment).  
We address this concern in a number of ways. First, we control for firm-, industry-, and 
market-level economic indicators that may explain the firm’s corporate policies. Second, we 
exclude from our sample professional experiences as the CEO of another firm since they might 
indicate that the CEO is an expert in managing distressed firms and implementing conservative 
policies. Third, we exclude from our sample firms that experienced distress themselves. Fourth, 
we estimate the effects in turnover regressions that include firm fixed effects and exclude 
turnovers that may be driven by the firm’s financial condition. 
To further address this identification challenge, we repeat our analysis focusing on 
professional experience from earlier years in the managers’ career. Specifically, we recreate our 
measures of CEO experience using only experience that occurred when the number of years 
between the experience and the start of the current employment is higher than the median 
number of years in our sample (7 years). For comparison, we also report the results for the 
complementary subset of recent experiences that occurred not more than 7 years before the 
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starting date of the CEO’s current employment. These results are reported in columns 1-6 of 
Table 6, Panel A. As before, the regressions include the same set of control variable and fixed 
effects, which are not reported. 
To further mitigate the concern of reverse causality, we push the experience even further 
back in time and require that it only occurs during the CEO’s first employment in our sample, or 
12 years, on average, before the start of the CEO’s current employment. This approach is similar 
to the approach in Schoar and Zuo (2013), who study the effect of the economic conditions when 
the CEO enters the labor market on her subsequent career. A CEO’s first employment is likely 
more exogenous to economic conditions that may lead to distress since workers typically do not 
choose when to start their professional career; rather, it is likely determined by cohort and age. 
Panel B of Table C shows that 28.4% of the CEOs in our sample experienced difficulties in their 
first job. The results are reported in columns 7-9 of Table 6, Panel A. 
The regression estimates in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that more distant experiences, 
including those during the CEO’s first employment, also exert a significant impact on corporate 
policies. The estimates are statistically significant across all measures and imply large economic 
magnitudes: based on columns 7-9 of Panel A, a CEO’s first job experience corresponds to 
reduction of 0.5 percentage points in debt issuance, an increase of 3.1 percentage points in cash 
savings, and a decline of 0.2 percentage points in capital expenditures. Interestingly, managers 
appear to put more weight on recent experiences. The estimates in columns 1-3 suggest that the 
effects of recent experiences are stronger than those of distant ones. 
In Panel B of Table 6, we disentangle the effect of experiencing financial trouble in the 
same industry from the effect of out-of- industry experience. We consider industry because it 
might be correlated with professional experience in various ways. It is possible, for example, that 
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executives from troubled firms who are most likely to survive to be the CEOs of other firms are 
ones from inside the industry, in which case our measure of professional experience might proxy 
for same-industry experience. Conversely, out-of-industry experience of distress might indicate 
that the CEO is a generalist whose expertise are in managing troubled firms and implementing 
conservative policies, in which case our measures of experience will proxy for the selection of 
the CEO by the firm, and therefore pick up a reverse causality effect. 
To test these possible confounding effects, we estimate our tests separately for out-of-
industry and same-industry experiences. In our sample, 23.0% of the professional experiences 
occurred outside the CEO’s current industry and the remaining 77.0% occurred in the same 
industry. This variation reflects the likelihood that past employment is in or out of the industry, 
as 79.8% of past employment occurs within the same industry regardless of financial conditions.  
In columns 1-3 of Table 6, Panel B, we exclude same-industry experiences and test the effect of 
out-of-industry experience against no experience. Similarly, in columns 4-6 we exclude out-of-
industry experiences and test the effect of same-industry experience. For brevity, we present only 
the results using the composite index but note that we obtain similar results for all the measures 
of distress. 
We find no differences between the effect of out-of-industry and same-industry 
experience of distress. Firms run by CEOs with either experience issue less debt, hold more cash, 
and invest less compared to firms run by CEOs that did not experience difficulties. The effects 
are highly statistically significant at the 1% level for both types of experience, and the regression 
coefficients are almost identical (-0.007 vs. -0.008 for debt issuance; 0.036 vs. 0.039 for cash 
savings; and -0.004 vs. -0.004 for capital expenditures). We therefore conclude that our effects 
are not driven by industry effects. 
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Our measures of experience require a manager to have only one exposure to a financial 
difficulty. However, many managers experience multiple years of distress. In our sample, 18.2% 
of the managers who experienced distress experienced them more than once. To determine if our 
tests are robust to alternative thresholds, we reestimate our measures of experience requiring 
managers to have more than one year of experience. The regressions, which are reported in 
columns 7-9 of Table 6, Panel B, exclude firm-year observations that correspond to CEOs that 
only experienced difficulties once.  Again, for brevity, we present only the results using the 
composite index but note that we obtain similar results for all the measures of distress.  
Similar to our earlier analysis, we find that firms run by CEOs who experienced 
difficulties issue less debt, hold more cash, and invest less in capital expenditures. Further, the 
impact of experience is stronger when the managers have had repeated experiences. The point 
estimates suggest that repeated experiences are associated with a reduction of 1.1 percentage 
points in debt issuance (compared to 0.8 percentage points for the full sample), an increase of 4.5 
percentage points in cash savings (compared to 3.8 percentage points for the full sample), and a 
reduction of 0.6 percentage points in capital expenditures (compared to 0.4 percentage points for 
the full sample). In unreported tests, we find that the differences between these estimates are also 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better. Taken together, these results suggest that 
repeated experiences increase the effect of experience on future corporate policy. This result is 
related to recent work by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2013), which shows that firms learn through 





B. The Professional Experience of CFOs 
So far the analysis has focused on the professional experience of the CEO. The results indicate 
that CEO experience affects corporate policies, and allow for two interpretations: (1) CEOs 
directly determine corporate policies, or (2) CFOs also determine corporate policies, but their 
decisions are positively correlated with CEO traits. In this subsection, we distinguish between 
the two interpretations by directly considering the effect of the professional experience of the 
CFO. To measure these professional experiences, we use the same methodology as in our main 
analysis.  
To study the professional experience of CFOs, we recreate our measures of professional 
experience at troubled firms for the 3,955 CFOs in our sample. As Table 2 shows, we find that 
0.6% to 12.5% of the CFOs in our sample were previously employed by troubled firms. 
In Table 7, we estimate panel regressions of corporate policies on the professional 
experience of the CFO, controlling for the professional experience of the CEO, a set of firm-, 
industry-, market-level controls similar to that in Table 3, and the characteristics of the CEO and 
the CFO. This approach allows us to compare the incremental effects of the professional 
experiences of both the CEO and the CFO on the firm’s policies. We also include the interaction 
term CEO experience x CFO experience to test whether the effects strengthen when both the 
CEO and the CFO experienced distress. As before, the standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level.   
The empirical results in Table 7 indicate that the firm’s financial policies, debt issuance 
and cash savings, are affected by the professional experiences of both the CEO and the CFO. 
Both the CEO and CFO effects are highly statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
economic magnitudes imply that the effect of the CFO’s professional experience is as important 
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as that of the CEO. In contrast, the firm’s investment policy is unaffected by the professional 
experience of the CFO. The results in column 3 suggest that only the professional experience of 
the CEO impacts the firm’s investment in capital expenditures. Columns 4-6 include the 
interaction term CEO experience x CFO experience, which is statistically insignificant for debt 
issuance and marginally significant for cash savings and capital expenditures. Similar to the 
results presented in Table 3 for CEOs, we find that older CFOs, male CFOs, CFOs that hold an 
MBA degree, and CFOs with more stocks and stock options tend to issue more debt, save less 
cash, and invest less, though the results for CFO characteristics are generally statistically weaker 
than those for the CEO.   
These findings suggest that the professional experiences of the CEO and the CFO have 
distinct effects on the firm’s financial policies. Our evidence on CFOs’ professional experience 
also complements recent studies that investigate the influence of CFOs on firms’ financial 
policies. Using survey evidence on CFOs, Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013) show that 
CFOs’ forecasts about the stock market and their own firm’s prospects are “miscalibrated” and, 
as a result, their firms follow more aggressive corporate policies. While we also find that CFOs 
affect corporate policies, our results indicate that CFOs that experienced distress in other 
companies tend to implement less aggressive policies relative to other CFOs. Malmendier and 
Zheng (2012) show that both CEOs’ and CFOs’ overconfidence impact corporate decision-
making. We complement their work by studying the joint impact of CEOs’ and CFOs’ 
professional experience on corporate policies. 
C. Professional Experience and Corporate Governance 
The evidence thus far may be consistent with both an efficient and an inefficient effect of 
professional experience on firms’ corporate policies. If CEOs that experienced distress in the 
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past overestimate the likelihood and adverse implications of distress, as implied by the “hot 
stove” effect described in Denrell and Marsh (2001), they might be more conservative than is 
optimal in order to hedge against distress. On the other hand, if CEOs, in general, are 
overconfident and underestimate risk, then the conservatism of CEOs who experienced troubles 
may push firms’ policies closer to their optimum. The view that managers are in general 
overconfident is consistent with the Hubris hypothesis introduced by Roll (1986) and with recent 
evidence provided by Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013).   
In this section, we distinguish between these hypotheses by studying if and how the 
effects differ across poorly-governed and well-governed firms. If professional experience fuels 
over-conservatism, it is likely to have a stronger effect in poorly-governed firms. On the other 
hand, if professional experience mitigates overconfidence and the miscalibration of risk, it will 
have a stronger effect in well-governed firms. 
To test the effects of corporate governance, we use a number of corporate governance 
measures to gauge the severity of the firm’s agency problems. In particular, we include the E-
Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)) of antitakeover provisions, where a higher index 
level indicates weaker governance. We also consider large shareholder monitoring. We define a 
blockholder indicator that equals 1 if an institutional investor holds 5% or more of the firm’s 
outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. Finally, we also consider the impact of the board of directors 
using board independence, where less independent boards represent weaker governance. We 
measure board independence as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. 
Table 8 presents the results of pooled regressions in which the dependent variable is one 
of the firm’s policies (debt issuance, cash savings, and investment). For brevity, we report the 
results for the composite index of professional experience, but the results persist across the 
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individual measures of professional experiences. The independent variable of interest is the 
interaction term between the composite index of professional experience and corporate 
governance. This term captures whether the association between professional experiences and 
corporate policy varies with the quality of corporate governance. Other independent variables 
include the index of professional experience, corporate governance, and the same set of controls 
as in our main analysis. For ease of interpretation, we standardize all the measures of corporate 
governance such that higher values correspond to poorer governance. As before, we include year 
and industry fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Due to data 
availability, our sample size decreases when we use the different governance measures. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between CEOs’ professional experience and 
corporate governance is negative and statistically significant for debt issuance and capital 
expenditures, and positive and significant for cash holdings. Since higher values of the 
governance measures imply worse quality of governance, these findings suggest that professional 
experience of distress has a stronger effect on corporate policies in poorly-governed firms. The 
interaction term is consistently significant at the 1% level and the regression coefficients are 
comparable in size across all columns.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
We know relatively little about how managers’ professional experience affects corporate policy. 
In this paper, we examine how prior employment at troubled firms affects managers’ financial 
and investment decisions. Our findings indicate that firms operated by CEOs who experienced 
distress at another firm behave more conservatively: they issue less debt, save more cash, and 
spend less on capital expenditures.   
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Existing evidence focuses on early-life and personal experiences, whereas our paper is 
the first to study the role of more recent professional experiences throughout the manager’s 
career. This setting might prove an important source of influence on managers’ decision-making 
because of the time proximity of these experiences and their greater degree of relevance to the 
type of decision-making required from corporate managers.  
Our findings provide a possible explanation, rooted in the psychology literature, for the 
differences in management style across corporate executives who go through different 
experiences. Moreover, our evidence suggests that management style is not time-invariant and 
that professional experiences may impact both the CEO’s career path and the decisions she 
makes as CEO.  
 Our paper also puts forth a possible explanation for why managers’ and investors’ views 
diverge. In particular, while shareholders are often unhappy with managerial conservatism, some 
managers still choose to behave conservatively. This issue has been often discussed in the 
business press. For example, the article “Cautious Companies Stockpile Cash,” published in the 
Wall Street Journal on December 6, 2012, quotes  La-Z-Boy Chief Executive Kurt Darrow: 
“’We want to keep probably a little more cash on hand than maybe some of our shareholders 
would appreciate, but we want to keep our financial flexibility… At this point, you might just 
call us a little conservative.’” Our paper suggests that managers’ experiences lead them to 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions  
Note: Compustat data items are given in parentheses 
A. Firm-level variables 
Blockholder is an indicator equal to 1 if an institutional investor holds 5% or more of the firm’s 
outstanding shares and 0 otherwise 
Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to total directors 
Cash/assets is cash plus short-term investments (che) divided by total assets (at) 
Cash Flow/assets is earnings (ebitda) less interest and taxes (txt+xint), divided by total assets 
(at) 
Capital expenditure/assets is capital expenditure (capx) divided by total assets (at) 
E-Index is an alternative antitakeover index to the G-Index, which is based on a subsample of 
relevant variables shown by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) to impact shareholder value 
Industry cash flow volatility is the 10-year rolling window median volatility of cash flow/assets 
across the 48 Fama-French industries 
Log(sales) is the natural logarithm of net sales (sale)  
Long-term debt/assets is long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at)  
Market-to-book is the market value of assets, defined as total assets (at) minus book equity (ceq) 
plus market value of equity (csho*prcc), divided by total assets (at) 
Net debt/assets is total debt (debt in current liabilities (dlc) plus long-term debt (dltt)) minus cash 
and short-term investments (che), divided by total assets (at) 
Net debt issuance/assets is the annual change in total debt (debt in current liabilities (dlc) plus 
long-term debt (dltt)), divided by total assets (at) 
Profitability is net income (ni) divided by total assets (at) 
Short-term debt/assets is debt in current liabilities (dlc) divided by total assets (at) 
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (at). 




B. Manager-level variables 
Age is the number of years since the manager was born 
Female is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager is a woman 
MBA degree is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager holds an MBA degree 
Professional experience (bankruptcy) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm 
that filed for chapter 11. 
Professional experience (bond ratings) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm 
that belonged to the lowest decile of Compustat firms based on annual credit ratings 
Professional experience (Hadlock and Pierce) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked 
at firm that belonged to the most constrained decile of Compustat firms based on the Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) index of financial constraints 
Professional experience (cash flow shocks) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at 
firm that belonged to the lowest decile of Compustat firms based on annual changes in 
operating cash flows 
Professional experience (stock returns) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at firm 
that belonged to the lowest decile of Compustat firms based on annual stock returns  
Professional experience (composite index) is the maximum of the five Experience variables: 
Professional experience (bankruptcy), Professional experience (bond ratings), Professional 
experience (Hadlock and Pierce), Professional experience (cash flow shocks), Professional 
experience (stock returns) 
Note: In all cases, we exclude past employment as the CEO of other firms 
Stock ownership is the ratio of the manager’s insider holdings of common stocks to the total 
shares outstanding 
Stock option ownership is the ratio of the manager’s holdings of stock options to the total shares 
outstanding 





Firm-level Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for firm-level variables used in the analyses. The sample comprises industrial 
firms in the Compustat/CRSP file from 1980 to 2011, with non-missing observations on total assets, and available 
information about the CEO’s prior employment for the last 10 years or more (without gaps) prior to joining the firm. 
Net debt issuance is the annual change in debt. Cash is cash and short-term investments. Industry cash flow volatility 
is the 10-year rolling window of median volatility of cash flow/assets across the 48 Fama-French industries. Cash 
flow/assets is measured as earnings less interest and taxes, divided by total assets. Market-to-book is measured as the 
book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by total assets. Size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Net debt/assets is measured as total debt (debt in current 
liabilities plus long-term debt) minus cash and short-term investments, divided by total assets. Short-term 
debt/assets is measured as debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. Long-term debt/assets is measured as 
long-term debt, divided by total assets. Log(sales) is the natural logarithm of net sales. Profitability is net income 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is measured as net property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets.   
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Net debt issuance/assets 0.026 0.020 0.182 
Cash/assets 0.240 0.127 0.262 
Capital expenditure/assets 0.060 0.039 0.067 
Industry cash flow volatility 0.094 0.084 0.051 
Cash flow/assets 0.021 0.065 0.239 
Market-to-book 2.308 1.637 1.962 
Size 5.963 5.858 2.058 
Net debt/assets -0.012 0.042 0.441 
Short-term debt/assets 0.038 0.009 0.144 
Long-term debt/assets 0.190 0.123 0.243 
Log(sales) 5.615 5.745 2.412 
Profitability 0.013 0.027 0.288 






This table presents information about the CEOs and CFOs in our sample. Panel A provides summary statistics about 
managers’ age, gender, tenure, stock ownership, and education. Panel B describes the measures of managers’ 
professional experience at troubled firms. Panel C provides the sample-wide correlations between measures of CEO 
professional experience. Panel D provides additional details about managers’ employment history and professional 
experiences. Professional experience (bankruptcy) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm that 
filed for chapter 11. Professional experience (bond ratings) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a 
firm that belonged to the lowest decile of Compustat firms based on annual credit ratings. Professional experience 
(Hadlock and Pierce) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm that belonged to the most 
constrained decile of Compustat firms based on the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of financial constraints. 
Professional experience (cash flow shocks) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm that belonged 
to the lowest decile of Compustat firms based on annual changes in operating cash flow. Professional experience 
(stock returns) is an indicator equal to 1 if the manager worked at a firm that belonged to the lowest decile of 
Compustat firms based on annual stock returns. Professional experience (composite index) is the maximum of the 
five Professional experience variables: Professional experience (bankruptcy), Professional experience (bond 
ratings), Professional experience (Hadlock and Pierce), Professional experience (cash flow shocks), Professional 
experience (stock returns). In all cases, we exclude past employment as the CEO of other firms. All variable 
definitions are given in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
CEOs 
Age 52.783 53.000 8.123 
Female 0.022 0.000 0.148 
Tenure 7.271 5.000 7.065 
Stock ownership 0.027 0.009 0.081 
MBA degree 0.333 0.000 0.471 
CFOs 
Age 47.069 47.000 7.123 
Female 0.024 0.000 0.153 
Tenure 6.848 5.000 6.907 
Stock ownership 0.015 0.000 0.021 
MBA degree 0.465 0.000 0.499 
 
 
Panel B: Frequency of professional experience 
 
Indicator CEO CFO 
Professional experience (bankruptcy) 0.8% 0.6% 
Professional experience (bond ratings) 8.1% 8.2% 
Professional experience (Hadlock and Pierce) 9.5% 9.2% 
Professional experience (cash flow shocks) 12.4% 11.4% 
Professional experience (stock returns) 12.1% 12.5% 




















Bond ratings 0.191 1.000 
Hadlock and Pierce 0.014 0.053 1.000 
Cash flow shocks 0.066 0.286 0.211 1.000 
Stock returns 0.148 0.225 0.131 0.298 1.000 
Composite index 0.163 0.552 0.294 0.677 0.655 1.000 
 
 
Panel D: Additional details about employment history and professional experience 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
All CEOs 
Employment history: N years 21.356 20.000 5.628 
Employment history: N firms 3.873 3.000 3.883 
CEOs with composite index = 1 
Employment history: N years 21.028 20.000 5.586 
Employment history: N firms 3.691 3.000 3.705 
N professional experiences 1.226 1.000 1.683 
N years since first experience 11.894 13.000 8.425 
N years since last experience 5.249 5.000 6.528 
First job experience  0.284 0.000 0.426 
All CFOs 
Employment history: N years 17.581 15.000 4.992 
Employment history: N firms 2.619 2.000 3.126 
CFOs with composite index = 1 
Employment history: N years 17.264 15.000 4.774 
Employment history: N firms 2.586 2.000 3.037 
N professional experiences 1.188 1.000 1.532 
N years since first experience 10.377 11.000 7.669 
N years since last experience 5.048 6.000 6.104 






CEOs’ Professional Experience and Corporate Policy  
This table presents evidence on the relation between the professional experience of the CEO and firm-level financial policies. In panel 
A, the dependent variable is the ratio of net debt issuance to book assets. In panel B, the dependent variable is the ratio of cash 
reserves to book assets. In panel C, the dependent variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to book assets. The key variable of 
interest is Professional experience, defined as an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO worked at another firm that experienced difficulties. 
We use five measure of difficulties based on bankruptcy filings, bond ratings, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of financial 
constraints, adverse cash flow shocks, and adverse shocks to the firm’s annual stock return. We also calculate a composite index of 
Professional experience, defined as the maximum of these five measures. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. All the 
regressions include year and 48 Fama-French industries fixed effects. Intercept and fixed effects are not shown. The standard errors 
(in brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** 
= 5%, *** = 1%. 
 


























Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional 
experience 
-0.015* -0.009** -0.009 -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
[0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Log(sales) 
0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Market-to-book 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Profitability 
-0.016** -0.016** -0.017** -0.019*** -0.018** -0.017** 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Tangibility 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
CEO age (/100) 
0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Female 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
MBA degree 
0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005* 0.005* 0.005** 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Stock ownership 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Stock option 
ownership 
0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 































Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional 
experience 
0.025* 0.017** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 
[0.014] [0.008] [0.018] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Industry cash flow 
volatility 
0.470*** 0.462*** 0.456*** 0.427*** 0.441*** 0.449*** 
[0.100] [0.101] [0.100] [0.100] [0.101] [0.100] 
Cash flow/assets 
-0.109*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.105*** 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Market-to-book 
0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Credit ratings 
-0.229*** -0.223*** -0.234*** -0.210*** -0.231*** -0.223*** 
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Size 
-0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
CEO age (/100) 
-0.270*** -0.274*** -0.281*** -0.282*** -0.276*** -0.282*** 
[0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.031] 
Female 
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
MBA degree 
-0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010** -0.009* -0.012** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Stock ownership 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Stock option 
ownership 
-0.023*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
[0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 































Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional 
experience 
-0.012** -0.004** -0.005* -0.003 -0.006*** -0.004*** 
[0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Market-to-book 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
Cash flow/assets 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
CEO age (/100) 
-0.015* -0.014* -0.016* -0.015* -0.014* -0.014 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Female 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
MBA degree 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Stock ownership 
-0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Stock option 
ownership 
-0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 29,226 







The Appointment Channel 
This table presents estimates from regressions explaining firms’ financial policies in the year prior to the year that immediately precedes the appointment of a 
new CEO. In panel A, the dependent variable is the ratio of net debt issuance to book assets. In panel B, the dependent variable is the ratio of cash reserves to 
book assets. In panel C, the dependent variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to book assets. The key variable of interest is Professional experience, defined 
as an indicator equal to 1 if the newly appointed CEO worked at another firm that experienced difficulties. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. All 
the regressions include the same controls as in Table 3, as well as year and 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects, which are not shown. The standard errors (in 
brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 
Panel A: Net debt issuance 
 





















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience index 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** -0.002 -0.002** 
[0.002] [0.004] [<0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
R-Squared 0.088 0.091 0.087 0.089 0.087 0.092 
 
Panel B: Cash holdings 
 





















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience index 
0.008 0.006 0.014*** 0.013** 0.010** 0.010** 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 





Panel C: Capital expenditures 
 





















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience index 
-0.002** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003** -0.002 -0.001* 
[0.001] [0.004] [0.016] [0.001] [0.004] [<0.001] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 






This table presents estimates from fixed effects and first-difference regressions surrounding CEO turnover. Panel A includes all CEO turnovers. Panel B 
corresponds to turnovers in which the CEO departed as part of a succession plan, due to health reasons (including deaths), or retired at the age of 60 or older. 
Panel C includes internal turnovers in which the new CEO came from inside the firm. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. All the regressions 
include the same controls as in Table 3, as well as year and 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects, which are not shown. The standard errors (in brackets) are 
heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Panel A: All CEO turnovers 
 
Specification Firm fixed effects Changes around CEO turnovers 




issuance ΔCash holdings 
ΔCapital 
expenditure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience 
index 
-0.008** 0.023** -0.005** -0.014** 0.024** -0.008* 
[0.004] [0.009] [0.002] [0.007] [0.010] [0.005] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 12,294 12,294 12,294 1,429 1,429 1,429 






Panel B: Succession/Health/Age-Related CEO turnovers 
 
Specification Firm fixed effects Changes around CEO turnovers 




issuance Cash holdings 
Capital 
expenditure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience 
index 
-0.009** 0.028*** -0.005** -0.016** 0.025** -0.006 
[0.004] [0.009] [0.002] [0.007] [0.012] [0.004] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 8,462 8,462 8,462 976 976 976 
R-Squared 0.149 0.811 0.623 0.136 0.048 0.019 
 
 
Panel C: Internal CEO turnovers 
 
Specification Firm fixed effects Changes around CEO turnovers 




issuance Cash holdings 
Capital 
expenditure 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Professional experience 
index 
-0.008** 0.026** -0.004** -0.014** 0.025*** -0.009* 
[0.004] [0.012] [0.002] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 10,081 10,081 10,081 1,228 1,228 1,228 





Robustness and Extensions 
This table presents evidence on the relation between the professional experience of the CEO and firm-level financial policies (net debt issuance, cash holdings, and capital 
expenditures). Panel A extends the analysis in Table 3 to consider the timing of the professional experience. Recent (Distant) experiences occurred more than 6 years (less 
than 6 years) prior to the start of the CEO’s current position. (6 years is the median number of years since a CEO experienced distress.) Panel B considers the industry in 
which the CEO experienced distress and the number of experiences the CEO encountered through her career. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. All the 
regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 3, as well as year and 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects, which are not shown to conserve space. The standard 
errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the firm level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Panel A: Timing of professional experiences 
 




















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Professional 
experience index 
-0.010*** 0.044*** -0.005*** -0.006** 0.033*** -0.003** -0.005* 0.031*** -0.002** 
[0.003] [0.009] [0.001] [0.003] [0.008] [0.001] [0.003] [0.008] [0.001] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 24,549 24,549 24,549 26,303 26,303 26,303 23,919 23,919 23,919 





Panel B: Industry and number of professional experiences 
 




















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Professional 
experience index 
-0.007*** 0.036*** -0.004*** -0.008*** 0.039*** -0.004*** -0.011*** 0.045*** -0.006*** 
[0.003] [0.009] [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.007] [0.001] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 23,374 23,374 23,374 27,478 27,478 27,478 23,012 23,012 23,012 





CFOs’ Professional Experience 
This table presents evidence on the relation between the professional experience of both the CEO and the CFO and firm-level 
financial policies (net debt issuance, cash holdings, and capital expenditures). All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. 
All the regressions include the same set of controls as in Table 3, as well as year and 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects, 
which are not shown to conserve space. The standard errors (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the 














Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO professional 
experience 
-0.006*** 0.030*** -0.003** -0.005** 0.027*** -0.002** 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] 
CFO professional 
experience 
-0.011*** 0.036*** -0.001 -0.010** 0.024*** 0.001 
[0.003] [0.006] [0.001] [0.004] [0.007] [0.002] 
CEO x CFO 
professional 
experience 
-0.003 0.013* -0.005* 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.003] 
CEO age 
0.027 -0.298*** 0.001 0.027 -0.298*** 0.001 
[0.018] [0.034] [0.009] [0.018] [0.034] [0.009] 
CEO female 
-0.008 0.005 -0.002 -0.008 0.005 -0.002 
[0.009] [0.016] [0.004] [0.009] [0.016] [0.004] 
CEO MBA degree 
0.006** -0.008 0.002 0.006** -0.008 0.002 
[0.003] [0.006] [0.001] [0.003] [0.006] [0.001] 
CEO stock ownership 
-0.121 0.053 -0.024*** -0.121 0.053 -0.024*** 
[0.200] [0.046] [0.005] [0.201] [0.045] [0.005] 
CEO stock option 
ownership 
0.037*** -0.075*** -0.015*** 0.037*** -0.074*** -0.015*** 
[0.005] [0.009] [0.002] [0.005] [0.009] [0.002] 
CFO age 
0.035* -0.089** 0.002 0.034* -0.087** 0.003 
[0.021] [0.037] [0.009] [0.021] [0.037] [0.009] 
CFO female 
-0.006 0.019* -0.001 -0.006 0.019* -0.001 
[0.005] [0.010] [0.003] [0.005] [0.010] [0.003] 
CFO MBA degree 
0.001 -0.012** 0.001 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] 
CFO stock ownership 
-0.174 -0.138 -0.063* -0.174 -0.137 -0.0627* 
[0.1670] [0.120] [0.033] [0.167] [0.125] [0.033] 
CFO stock option 
ownership 
0.137 -0.218 -0.301** 0.137 -0.208 -0.299** 
[0.293] [0.674] [0.140] [0.295] [0.673] [0.141] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 23,681 23,681 23,681 23,681 23,681 23,681 





CEOs’ Professional Experience and Corporate Governance 
This table presents evidence on the relation between corporate governance, the professional experience of the CEO, and firm-level financial policies (net debt issuance, 
cash holdings, and capital expenditures). The corporate governance measures are standardized such that higher values correspond to poorer corporate governance. The key 
variable of interest is the interaction term: Professional experience index x Governance. All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. All the regressions include the 
same set of controls as in Table 3, as well as year and 48 Fama-French industry fixed effects, which are not shown to conserve space. The standard errors (in brackets) are 























E-index Blockholder Board independence 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Professional 
experience index 
-0.005** 0.021* -0.003 -0.005 0.022*** -0.003 -0.004** 0.018** -0.002* 
[0.002] [0.012] [0.008] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001] 
Governance 
0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 0.008 -0.001 0.001*** 0.038*** -0.041*** 0.007 
[0.001] [0.001] [<0.001] [0.009] [0.002] [<0.001] [0.011] [0.015] [0.006] 
Professional 
experience index X 
Governance 
-0.003*** 0.005*** -0.002*** -0.004** 0.023*** -0.004*** -0.018*** 0.049*** -0.014** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.015] [0.006] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Observations 14,823 14,823 14,823 15,186 15,186 15,186 26,857 26,857 26,857 
R-Squared 0.041 0.529 0.339 0.039 0.520 0.347 0.043 0.542 0.344 
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